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As a result of immigration Dutch society is increasingly being confronted with many kinds of practices from other cultures. This is not usually a problem, and of familiarisation develops gradually over the course of time. In some cases however, a cultural practice may be at odds with the standards and values which are seen as fundamental to Dutch society. Moreover, if practising a cultural custom results in a punishable offence, the question arises how this cultural tradition is to be evaluated by the law: is prosecution of the offence expedient? In recent years cultural defence has been increasingly employed as justification for apparently illegal practices. Manslaughter has been involved, motivated, according to the offender, by  cultural necessity of revenge. 
Another cultural tradition which has recently been problematical in the Dutch political debate is the circumcision of girls and women, termed female genital mutilation (FGM).​[2]​ According to estimates 130 million women and girls worldwide are circumcised and 2 million circumcisions are performed annually.​[3]​ Although the type of circumcision may vary, as well as the age at which it occurs, the procedure results in the irreparable mutilation of the female genitalia. In the Netherlands the custom is practised within several population subgroups, on girls between the ages of eight and thirteen years. 
Practically all organisations, national and international, condemn FGM. In 2001 the European Council designated it as an ‘inhumane procedure’ as defined by Art. 3 of the EVRM. It is important to note that not only Western countries have condemned FGM, but that this prohibition is also supported by international organisations and governments in the home countries.​[4]​ A number of these countries has legislation regarding this issue, even though it is not enforced. The same is true, however, of West European countries; here too, penalisation – whether of a specific or general nature – is not enforced. Until now France has been the only country where FGM cases have been actively prosecuted. 

This difference in enforcement raises questions. Clearly, penal statutes are intended to be enforced, certainly when such serious punishable offences as FGM are involved. In recent years the Dutch Parliament has raised questions concerning the policy of the Dutch government on FGM. Because in the Netherlands as well, FGM is punishable under assault and child abuse laws, but up until the present not a single case has ever been brought before a court. This parliamentary pressure, in combination with the increasing international attention for FGM and the responsibilities of the courts has recently resulted in the establishment of a state commission (the Sanders commission) which has been given the task of making recommendations on how to improve efforts to combat FGM. The report of the comission Sanders is to be expected medio March 2005.​[5]​ The basic premise of the commission is that any form of FGM should be prohibited, a premise that is consistent with the viewpoint of the Dutch government. Starting from that viewpoint, the question to consider is how to improve the criminal investigation and prosecution of FGM, in which the option of introducing a specific provision can also be placed under discussion.  
In this paper I will answer the question of whether such a specific provision is desirable; to this end I will inventory the associated advantages and disadvantages (para. 4). For that purpose I will carry out a brief legal comparison based on relevant Dutch and Belgian penal provisions (para. 5). Prior to that I will pose the question of whether criminal enforcement is desirable (para 3). In the scope of that discussion the meaning of a cultural defence is also considered as a possible justification for FGM as well as a factor for lenience in sentencing. First, however, for the sake of clarity a short description of FGM and its cultural background is necessary (para. 2).

2. Forms of circumcision and cultural background
As mentioned, FGM is a widespread practice. The origin can be found on the African continent, in some parts of Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia) and in the Middle East (Egypt, Yemen).​[6]​ It is an ancient custom, which was already being practiced 2,500 years ago. Although on a global scale, it is a relatively rare occurrence, the number of estimated circumcisions performed annually is large enough to be considered a serious social problem.​[7]​ 

Types of circumcision
The moment of circumcision varies according to the interpretation of the ritual in which it is involved. Sometimes circumcision is performed on infants​[8]​; at other times circumcision takes place at puberty, as a sign of the transition to another phase of life, or at the beginning of pregnancy, as protection of the foetus against the supposed detrimental influences of the clitoris.

In addition to the time it takes place, the form of the circumcision may also vary. The following forms are distinguished:​[9]​
1.	Circumcision (or clitoridectomy). This procedure removes the foreskin or the top of the clitoris. The procedure has been compared to the circumcision of boys and is reported to be performed only via modern surgical procedures on adult women. 
2.	Excision. This surgical procedure removes the clitoris as well as the labia minora.
3.	Infibulation. This is the most extreme procedure. The clitoris and both the labia minora and majora are cut away, after which the wound is fully stitched; healing occurs by holding the legs pressed stiffly against each other for a time. A small incision is left to allow the discharge of urine and blood. At marriage the wound is reopened, as well as at the birth of a child. As a rule reinfibulation follows.

It should be remembered that such circumcisions, with the exception of surgical circumcision, are usually performed without anaesthesia in unhygienic conditions, which may be fatal to the girl or woman. Van der Liet-Senders reports that 85 % of the women and girls that are circumcised undergo circumcision or excision; 15 % undergo infibulation. This last custom is practised, among others, within the Somali community in the Netherlands.​[10]​ It should be clear that this concerns an irreversible form of severe physical damage, paired with psychological trauma. Healthy, sexually functional parts of the female body are removed without any medical indication whatsoever; restorative plastic surgery can only partially repair the damage. 

Cultural motives
The disadvantages for girls and women are evident, but what benefits are offered in exchange? Why do women assent to their own circumcision, as well as to that of their daughters?  Viewed from a Western vantage point, such a ‘voluntary’ form of mutilation cannot be easily explained. Although Western women also may practise extreme forms of mutilation, such as branding or some forms of piercing, these are not nearly as drastic as the forms of genital mutilation named above.​[11]​

A number of cultural foundations can be claimed. First is the claim of religion: circumcision is said to be prescribed by the Koran or the Bible. However, such texts are not to be found in these scriptures, although they do exist in some authoritative interpretations.​[12]​ A second basis lies in the mythical belief that the female sexual organ, in particular the clitoris, has a detrimental effect on male sexuality, or even on the baby. It is self-evident that no valid foundation exists for such a superstition. A third reason is the necessity to control the sexuality of the woman. Without circumcision the woman may threaten to become promiscuous and no longer be under the control of her husband. Circumcision purges the woman of her overabundant sexuality and ensures that the man is able to adequately respond to the sexual demand of his wife. This image of purity is specifically expressed by the practice of infibulation, where the (potential) wife, remains, as it were, sealed until the moment that her husband can make his rightful claim on her sex. A corollary of this is the argument that circumcision increases the beauty of the woman, but – given the horrific mutilation which results from the more severe forms of circumcision – little significance can be attached to this argument. Finally, circumcision also serves as an initiation ritual, in the transition from girl to woman. This argument, however, is meaningless in cases where circumcision is performed at an extremely young age.

Gender perspective
The foundations stated illustrate in many regards a gendered approach to female sexuality. The sexual autonomy of the girl/woman in such a cultural setting does not stand on it own but derives its meaning from the sexuality of the man.​[13]​ The key to female sexual integrity within such a cultural context is contained in her circumcision.​[14]​ However, gender is of importance from a broader perspective as well: female sexuality derived from a male perception must also be examined against the background of marriage as a socio-economic necessity for the woman. In the countries where female circumcision is common, marriage for women is often one of few options for survival. Those who do not allow themselves to be circumcised are excluded from the community; in any case they are not considered to be marriageable and thus sacrifice a certain level of financial and social security.​[15]​ The consent of adult women to circumcision must be put into perspective against this background; as far as minor-aged girls are concerned, Western standards of legally valid consent are nonexistent, and in any case parents or others take the decision on their circumcisions. 

3. Criminal enforcement and cultural defence
The question of whether cultural tradition can be cited as a defence for inflicting serious physical damage, which in the worst case may even be fatal, quickly leads to a polarisation of the debate. The Western human rights tradition emphasises the universal character of human rights, and within it the protection of the physical and emotional integrity of the individual. Others, on the contrary, dismiss such an individualistic approach and see in this the unjust domination of  ‘enlightened’ Western thinking.​[16]​
The question is whether this apparent division can be put into perspective. Clearly a universal orientation towards human rights with the individual as its centre does not preclude an endorsement of the cultural context in which a violation of human rights must be judged.​[17]​ In other words: claims on physical and emotional integrity need not be incompatible with the right to a specific religious or cultural identity; neither of the two can pre-emptively be claimed with absolute validity.​[18]​ In a democratic state under the rule of law all parties must initially be granted the same latitude, in order that respect can be shown for the underlying social and cultural structures from which individuals derive their self-image.​[19]​ Again and again both should be measured against each other, within the context in which the rights are enforced, whereby care must be taken to adequately reflect on one’s own presuppositions embedded in the human rights discourse. Obviously, the strongly individualistic, ‘enlightened’ Western image of humanity is also an historic construction, formed under the influence of cultural and socio-economic circumstances. 
Does this mean that in the judgement of FGM as an alleged violation of human rights, a punishable offence, there should be allowance for a cultural defence, derived from the right to cultural self-determination or the right of religious freedom?  In principle yes, certainly the right of cultural determination is also a legitimate human right. At the same time however care must be taken to avoid cultural relativism; where the constitutional state’s own values threaten to become undermined, the openness of the constitutional state is pushed to its limits.​[20]​ 
This is also the case concerning acceptance of a cultural defence as justification for FGM. In the context of the modern Western constitutional state numerous arguments can be given within criminal enforcement for the rejection of this defence.

Irreversibility 
The first argument which can be made is due to the irreversible character of the act. The damage to the female body and its reproductive capacity caused by circumcision is disproportionate and for this reason cannot be justified by a claim of cultural determination.

Inequality
A second, corresponding argument is the gendered character of the socio-economic relationships in which this cultural justification is rooted. Within the international debate on FGM much attention has been given to the gender aspect and the corresponding inequality. In line with Article 2 of the Convention for the Exclusion of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) the objective is to realise equitable claims on human rights for men and women. It is generally accepted that such equal rights may not be denied on the basis of a public/private dichotomy, but can these rights then be denied where a claim is made on cultural traditions? In that case does government protection of equal rights for women cease to exist?​[21]​ 
Here we must proceed with caution. Obviously, some discretion concerning the validity of the discourse on equality is appropriate, as Holtmaat has stated.​[22]​ Not only did this idea only derive legitimacy within Western thinking in the recent past, the claim of legitimacy is not universally accepted without any doubt. And it is certainly not accepted without question where it implies a criticism of non-Western-oriented sexual cultural practices.​[23]​ 
In addition, as Saharso and Römkens have noted, the Western world may be trying to relieve its own guilty conscience in this way.​[24]​ Many Western forms of  ‘everyday’ violence quickly seem less problematic when compared to a ‘bizarre’ form such as FGM. The problematisation of FGM as a theme in the multicultural debate is, they propose, a sign of a certain ethnocentrism and distracts us from the central theme: care for women.​[25]​ 
Although this appeal for reflection on and tempering of specific cultural convictions is pertinent, it does not reduce the necessity of taking measures against FGM. However, I would like to introduce a ‘territorial’ limitation at this point, in the sense that I believe that a criminal justice approach relating to FGM must be differentiated to match the region in which the efforts to combat it take place. When circumcisions have a direct contiguity with Western society, I have, with due consideration, no difficulty accepting that the Western discourse on equality should prevail. The cultural argument simply offers insufficient scope for this claim on equality with its claim of sexual self-determination of girls and women contained within it.​[26]​
When intervention on FGM outside the Western world is concerned, then the legitimacy of such claims on equality should be judged within that context.​[27]​ But then too it holds that, as Funder observed, the debate should centre on the dichotomy between the sexes and not be phrased in terms of sexually neutral comparisons:

‘The outcry against stopping the practice, however, is a plea in the name of culture, not of women’s sexuality. The reason is that women’s morality (that is, the control of men over women’s sexuality, or measures taken uphold the notion that as “less sexual women is more moral”) is a barometer of cultural integrity: the extent of control over women measures the extent of control of the men, of traditional values, in the face of a potentially liberatory (and to that extent invasive) Western tradition’.​[28]​

In the best interest of the child?
There is also a third argument that calls for judicial intervention, specifically the best interests of the child. From the perspective of human rights, restraint is normally observed regarding the domain of the family; the government’s stance on this is to maintain a reserved distance (Art. 8 section 1 EVRM). When the circumcision of girls as requested by the parents or family members is concerned however, other arguments pertain; the interest of the child prevails. The actions of the legal representatives, the parents, must be measured by objective criteria, in service to that interest, in particular in the interest of health (art. 24 lid 3 CCR).​[29]​ The basic assumption is that the child is an autonomous legal subject that requires representation under the law so that its right to self-determination is respected.
In light of the mutilating, irreversible character of FGM it cannot be argued that this is beneficial to the health of the girl. As concerns the right to self-determination, the situation is more complex. Clearly, the right to self-determination applies not only to sexuality but also to cultural identity. In fact neither are respected in the case of FGM: the minor-aged girl is unable to adequately judge such consequential decisions.​[30]​ That which prevails is the desire of the parents to transmit their right of cultural self-determination. This ‘intrinsic interest’ however is not the same as the interest of the child; viewed objectively, such advocacy cannot be defended. 
Moreover, here too the inviolability of the body, contained in law on physical and psychological integrity, should prevail over the right of cultural self-determination.​[31]​ This is especially true where this cultural identity is based on a gendered standpoint, as is the case of a child of female sex. There can be no question of actual freedom of will or the self-determination to follow religious practices or cultural norms given the position of the girl, who is dependent in a number of ways. When assessed against the relevance criterion formulated by Veerman c.s. the results do not favour a cultural defence: the nature and scope of damage or potential damage to health, in conjunction with the effects of the adopted strategy in relation to the objective (safeguarding health) and the possibility of employing alternative means to attain the objective, impede due protection under the law.​[32]​ 
It may be observed that this does not exclude decriminalisation of the lesser form of FGM.​[33]​ Consistent with current opinion however, the Dutch government contends that this type of circumcision must also be considered indefensible; this viewpoint gives circumcision a sexually discriminating character. Although the principle of this viewpoint can be supported, a different approach appears to undermine that support; other results are also plausible. That however leaves the conclusion intact, that the Dutch government is prepared to take action against FGM on a number of grounds.
4. Generalis or specialis? 
Now that it has been established that the efforts of the Dutch government to combat FGM are legitimate, the question arises as to what the role of a criminal procedure to that end could fulfil. In fact criminal justice already has jurisdiction here; FGM is punishable as gross maltreatment (art. 300-303 Dutch Penal Code; DPC). Where parents or legal guardians are involved, the penalty is increased (art. 304 DPC). Moreover, should the girl die as the result of circumcision, a case can be made for manslaughter versus grievous bodily harm (art. 307-309 DPC).
In any case FGM is a punishable offence. However, enforcement is not an easy matter. The offence is committed in a closed family circle, to which police and criminal justice authorities do not have easy access. Those directly involved are unlikely to report violations to the police. The only chance for success would seem to be reports of violations from the medical and/or social service sectors, at least as far as professional codes of ethics do not prohibit this.​[34]​ In addition it can be noted that reports are made on a voluntary basis, and as a rule come through the intermediary Advies- en Meldpunten Kindermishandeling [ChildLine].​[35]​
But imagine that police and the public prosecutor were to become aware of a circumcision or the likelihood of one; would a specific provision for FGM ease their task? Opinions regarding this are divided. In its resolution on the genital mutilation of women the European Parliament has requested its member states to regard FGM as ‘an offence’, a term which reveals no specific preference.​[36]​ Neither does the need for supplementary legal measures referred to in the same resolution offer concrete criteria for the method of prosecution. 
In the meantime, a number of member states (such as Sweden, Austria, Belgium and the United Kingdom) have passed specific criminal provisions. An appeal for this has also been heard in other countries, specifically in the Dutch Parliament.​[37]​ Conversely, the Dutch government (as a whole) has taken the position that such a specific provision is not desirable.​[38]​ However, considering the legitimacy of introducing a specific privision regarding FGM requires an awareness of the different types of specific provisions. One can create an new legal provision, or prefer to introduce a new paragraph towards a regular legal provision qualifying FGM as a specific variant of (child) abuse, justifying increased maximum sentences. As the current debate concentrates on the question whether or not the introduction of a new legal provision is legitimate, alternatives should also be taken into account. Bearing this in mind, what are the arguments for and against a specific provision?

4.1 Arguments against a specific provision

Subsidiarity and symbolic legislation 
The basic premise is that criminal justice is ultimum remedium. That necessitates a critical attitude in regard to the adoption of specific provisions: if general provisions are adequate, specific provisions should not be set. Care must be taken to avoid the expansion of criminal justice, certainly where insufficient efforts have been made to enforce existing provisions.​[39]​ It is clear that FGM falls under the designation of the general provisions regarding assault as well as grievous bodily harm (with premeditation) (art. 300-303 DPC). The adoption of a specific provision therefore would not seem self-evident. Taken together with the problem of detection discussed above, a specific provision is likely to be seen as symbolic legislation.​[40]​ Thus criminal law will miss the mark. Moreover, while the symbolic function of specific provisions cannot be denied, the purpose of such provisions is enforcement. From that rationale symbolic legislation is to be avoided. 
Another corresponding objection is that a criminal, repressive reaction can only be the last resort in a nuanced approach, aimed at education and prevention. A specific provision will emphasise the criminality of FGM and may thus trigger criminalisation and stigmatisation of the target group, which is likely to lead to the practices ‘going underground’ and decrease the chance of prevention.  

The exception needs no rule? 
Another question concerns the defence for such a specific provision; is it necessary to make such an exception? A good interpretation of the purpose of criminal justice implies an allowance for minority opinions. The purpose of criminal law and the law in general is of course to serve the emancipation of the individual, which also includes the right to one’s own cultural identity. From the perspective of equality and the respect associated with it, criminal law recognises a principle of openness from which justice can be done to the cultural identity of the individual.​[41]​ Assuming that the general provision is formulated so that it makes allowances for such open interpretation, it is neither the specific nor the general character of the provision, but the basic attitude in which this is applied which determines the degree to which justice is done in regard to minority opinions.​[42]​ From this viewpoint the adoption of a specific provision cannot be defended, nor is it necessary. That implies no misunderstanding of the right to cultural self-determination, but is the logical result of a ‘consequent implementation of the individual approach of the law’​[43]​ within which the interest of the individual is weighed against that of society. The interests of society however, demand a certain defining of the limits of the principle of openness practised within criminal law.​[44]​ The boundary lies where – as in the case of FGM – damage is done to the equality of individuals, specifically where there is evidence of a misunderstanding of human rights. 
Another, corresponding argument against the adoption of a specific provision is the accompanying risk of fragmentation of society. Who determines whether and why a specific provision is justified in a particular case? What is there to prevent that all sorts of others with just as many justifiable minority positions negotiate specific provisions in criminal law? Here an unacceptable risk of the erosion of legal protection arises. 

4.2 Arguments for a specific provision 

Legality: signalling function and fitting retribution
Judged by the criteria of the criminal penal code FGM is child abuse. However, parents who allow their daughters to be circumcised would not call it as such. To the contrary, they experience circumcision as being in the best interests of their daughter. Here to judicial options occure. First one could state that the parents behaviour is not unlawfull. It does not respond to the tenor of the legal provision, therefore the so-called ‘Typizität’  is missing. The cutting of the female genitals symbolises a positive action, pointed at the transmission of the girl towards adulthood enabling her to become a full member of the group.  As such the circumcision does not respond to the legal concept of assault, implying an intended violence of the physical integrity. Therefore the circumcision cannot be qualified as  assault, as a result of which an acquittal should follow. However, as such an appeal reflects personal cultural beliefs, it is not likley to be accepted. 
A second option is to appeal for miscarriage of justice: the parents have erred concerning the criminality of the circumcision, something which is understandable, given that from their cultural background they do not experience this as assault. There is no evidence of acting in an unlawful manner, in the sense of art. 300 e.v. DPC. Following article 350 Dutch Penal Code of Procedure such an appeal should result in a resigment of prosecution. 
Now one can push such a defence aside with the argument that the provisions are clear enough; the parents’ ignorance of the unlawfulness of FGM is no excuse. However, that argumentation would seem to be too simple: the target group are after all immigrants. Can the same demands be made on the legal consciousness of the citizen where ‘imported crimes’​[45]​ are concerned as when regular crimes are concerned? Specific provisions should send a clear signal, whereby justice is done to the responsibility of the legislator to set clear standards (lex certa-principle, art. 1 DPC). 
Connected with this is the question of where such a specific provision for FGM should be placed in the Penal Code. Looking at the current legal system, placement in XX, concerning ‘Assault’, would seem the most appropriate place. But another option would be placement in title XIV, dealing with ´Indecency’. The argument that the target group (members of an ethnic minority) do not experience FGM as an act of abuse, lends support to this idea. Classification of the act as assault or infliction of grievous bodily harm can be seen as an attack on that particular group, something which may increase the appeal for a specific cultural identity, and the associated practices may thus be driven further into illegality. Placing specific provisions on, for example, title XIV could contribute to the prevention of such undesirable stigmatisation. The ‘Indecency’ cited there after all has to do with standards of moral decency, which is understood also as proper care for the minor-aged child (art. 252 en 253 DPC).​[46]​

Subsidiarity from the other side
It has been stated above that a specific provision brings the risk of fragmentation of society or of criminal justice. But is this really the case? After all, a specific provision for FGM does not imply any impunity; it only creates a shift of emphasis engendered by meeting the need of minority groups for the right of cultural self-determination. Now that the views of minority groups do not justify impunity, shall we not consider, from the principle of open-mindedness, whether the cultural dilemma faced by minority groups due to the general provision can be solved in another way, or at least eased? In the case of FGM although a specific provision may not bring the desired impunity, it may be able to remove the stigma of abuse and perhaps create a lesser punishment. 
An associated argument is that by doing so a ´more fitting reprisal’ might be offered.​[47]​ After all: if the provision can be formulated in a way that is acceptable to the target group the moral appeal embedded within it is more likely to serve its purpose and in the process a certain acceptance of the provision and its enforcement can be created within the minority group. Such an endorsement of the penal standard does require an accompanying policy aimed at the education of the target group. If this is missing the foundation for legitimacy has been officially fulfilled but the material implementation will remain inadequate.​[48]​ 

Reduced scope for pursuing a cultural defence?
An ‘accompanying’ advantage is also that the process appears to place limits on the pursuance of a cultural defence. By formulating a clear provision, leaving no place for cultural considerations, the scope for a cultural defence, and with it psychological circumstances beyond one’s control, becomes limited. This offers the potential offender, with the enlistment of the aid of the legal standard, an instrument to resist the culturally determined appeal to allow FGM to be performed. It is then, after all, not one’s personal moral judgement that influences the decision against the circumcision, but the penalty and the accompanying threat of sanctions by the Dutch legislator.
In the process a counter-balance is also offered to the increasing use of justification due to psychological circumstances beyond one’s control (art. 40 DPC), as a legal interpretation of cultural defence. In practice such a defence is seldom accepted; the accused is nearly always viewed as having had the opportunity to abstain from the challenged acts, or at least to have been able to devise a less-intrusive alternative.​[49]​ Regarding the circumcision of girls there would seem to be no other test possible: the pain and suffering of the parents as the result of their inability to fulfil the cultural demands of the group clearly cannot prevail against the unlawful, sexually discriminating violation of the physical and emotional integrity of their daughter, along with the attendant pain and suffering.

5. A view of the practice: a brief legal comparison 
Apart from the considerations of legal theory and legal politics described above, the question can be posed of whether the adoption of a specific provision will benefit enforcement. In order to formulate an initial answer to this question, a short legal comparison follows. What can a comparison of the generally formulated art. 303 DPC and the specialis formulated in article 409 of the Belgian Penal Code (BPC) generate? For the scope of this paper I will limit myself, at least as far as possible, to a few sections/paragraphs from both provisions.

Article 303 section 1 DPC states:
´Gross maltreatment with premeditation is punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of twelve years or a fine of the fifth category.  

Article 409 paragraph 1 Belgian Penal Code (BPC) states:
´(S)he that performs, enables or facilitates any form of mutilation on the genitals of a person of the female sex, with or without her permission, is punishable by imprisonment of three to five years ´

Rationale and scope
The aim of art. 409 BPC is to make FGM an offence ‘in an unambiguous manner’.​[50]​ Given the consequences of FGM to the emotional health and development of the girls and women who would be circumcised, such a specific provision is considered appropriate. The case is strengthened because it not only concerns a single circumcision but also has influence on the surrounding group. Thus art. 409 BPC also pertains to ‘those in the circuit’ who organise the performance of FGM on a relatively large scale, when necessary in other countries. In the fifth paragraph a broad statement of responsibility is formulated resembling that which is formulated in art. 249 DPC. Both statements express the spirit of care for the minor child, or from a person dependent on the offender. The scope of the functional responsibility laid down in art. 409 BWs is quite broad. Thus the dependence required does not need to have a judicial foundation; evidence of a concrete dependent relationship – even if of short duration – is adequate.​[51]​

Art. 303 DPC makes the deliberate infliction of grievous bodily harm a punishable offence. In the subsequent art. 82 DPC harm is taken to mean that which cannot be fully recovered or that which causes incapacity for work; purely psychological damage does not meet this requirement.​[52]​ It is up to the judge to determine what can be understood as grievous bodily harm; it is likely that the most severe forms of FGM would fall into this category. Of further relevance is the relation between 303 and the aggravated circumstances formulated in art. 304 sub 1 DPC: if the crime is committed against a minor-aged child, the punishment may be increased by one-third. Here the legislator has formulated functional responsibility in a way similar to art. 409 para. 5 BPC, however, with the provision that this is limited to offenders who are legally related to the child.
 
Mutilation vs. gross maltreatment: illegality as a component
A second point of comparison is offered by the component ‘mutilation’ ex art. 409 BPC and the component ‘gross maltreatment’ ex art. 303 DPC. In both provisions the legislator has not found it necessary to explicitly exempt medical procedures.​[53]​ 
In both descriptions of the offence, illegality is expressed in the level of the components and must therefore be proved by the public prosecutor. For art. 409 BPC this is derived from the component ‘mutilation’; the component does not refer to ‘minor damage’ of the genitals, but to more severe forms of damage. The same normative connotation is expressed by the component ‘gross maltreatment’ stated in art. 303 section 1 DPC: it must be proven that the act one is accused of is in conflict with the objective law.​[54]​  
A difference can be seen in art. 409 para.1 BPC, which expressly determines that consent of the woman or girl to undergoing FGM does not lead to impunity; the act remains unlawful. In the Dutch legal system consent may lead to acquittal, as the behaviour is not unlawfull for reason of not responding to the tenor of the legal provision (‘Typizität’).
The question is whether the woman has been able to freely consent, given her position, which may be one of dependence. In the case of a minor-aged child consent is legally irrelevant, due to her lack of legal capacity to act. At the very most consent of the child might be seen as a basis for reduced sentencing, but even this seems doubtful. The same observation can be made regarding the consent of the woman: if the judge is of the opinion that this consent does not negate the illegality, he or she can, if desired, take this into consideration in determining the sentence.

The nature of the damage
Another significant difference is that the ‘mutilation’ ex art. 409 BPC would seem to involve a less serious form of damage than the ‘gross maltreatment’ in ex art. 303 DPC. Clearly, if the mutilation results in an apparently incurable illness or incapacity for work, the sentence may be increased on the basis of the third paragraph.​[55]​ There is no evidence of such exceptional circumstances allowing increased sentencing in art. 303 DPC. Although the article refers to ‘gross maltreatment’ and not to ‘grievous bodily harm’ the meaning of art. 82 DPC can be applied here too; art. 303 is after all a graver variant of art. 302 DPC.​[56]​ The component ‘gross maltreatment’ therefore demands the incurable (appearing) illness and incapacity for work already mentioned in art. 409 para. 3 BPC as a circumstance for increased sentencing. What does this difference in wording mean with regard to the burden of proof for the public prosecutor? There can be no argument concerning the mutilating nature of the most severe forms of FGM; it concerns irreversible procedures that lead to severe damage of the female sexual organs. It is sufficient for the Belgian public prosecutor to produce a medical report showing evidence of such damage.​[57]​ If there is such damage, an increase in sentencing listed in para. 3 can be charged and the evidence for this should be presented. That not the case for the Dutch public prosecutor, who must prove that there is evidence of ‘gross maltreatment’: there must be evidence of such severe damage that there is no chance of full recovery or similar serious harm. The burden of proof on the grounds of generic provisions therefore would seem to be heavier for the Dutch public prosecutor in comparison to the Belgian variant.
Incidentally, in both provision clauses, there is a question whether this pertains to the lesser form of FGM, the circumcision. That procedure involves only a small incision of the clitoris, something which would not appear to be categorised as ´mutilation` or ´gross maltreatment` ex art. 303 section 1 DPC.

Mutilation vs. premeditation 
There is rather a difference in wording, particularly in the requirement of intent. In the Belgian definition this is contained in the component ‘mutilation’; in the Dutch definition the intent is stated separately in the form of ‘with premeditation’. In both cases there is evidence of acting with intent, in the sense that a conscious, intentional act in committed. For the appropriateness of art. 303 DPC however, it is relevant that this should be in the form of a malicious plan: it must be proven that the suspect deliberately and knowing, in conflict with objective law has caused grievous bodily harm in the form of FGM. Concerning art. 409 BPC it is sufficient to show likely cause that the accused at least had accepted that there was a considerable chance of mutilating the victim. In other words: conditional intent is sufficient. Clearly, here too the burden of proof weighs heavier for the Dutch public prosecutor.

Another comparison: art. 303 DPC vs. 409 BPC
One could dispute the comparison above, by observing that it is not art. 303 DPC, but art. 302 DPC that would seem to be the most likely rule to compare to art. 409 BPC. My choice for art. 303 DPC however is prompted by the relationship with art. 304 DPC, in which conditions for heavier sentencing are included if the circumcision is performed on a minor-aged child. In view of Cleiren and Nijboer there is evidence of a mutual bond, which justifies the primary choice for art. 303 as a comparative article.​[58]​ 
Nevertheless, a comparison between art. 302 DPC, as the most appropriate article for the prosecution of FGM, and art. 409 BPC is also an option. Therefore, a brief legal comparison of the two definitions follows, so that it can be determined whether an indictment based on art. 302 DPC removes a number of the objections listed above from art. 303 DPC.​[59]​ The text of the law is stated below for review.

Art. 302 lid 1 DPC states:
‘He that deliberately inflicts grievous bodily harm on another is guilty of gross maltreatment, punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of eight years or a fine of the fifth category.’

Presumption of illegality
The drawback of the public prosecutor having to prove the unlawfulness stated in art. 303 DPC is irrelevant here (‘Typizität’). There is no question of abuse, the task is to objectively determine the deliberate infliction of grievous bodily harm; illegality is presumed. If the suspect believes to have acted in a warranted manner it is his/her responsibility to produce evidence of such. Other than is the case for art. 303 DPC in relation to art. 409 BPC, the public prosecutor here has no burden of proof. Compared to the Belgian definition there is thus a lighter burden of proof for the Dutch public prosecutor.

The nature of the damage
Concerning the nature of the damage the comparison is on level pegging. The damage denoted in art. 302 DPC, just as that in art. 303 DPC, should be viewed in relation to art. 82 DPC. The difference in both definitions does not lie in the nature of inflicted damage, but in the intention of the act. Therefore it remains true that the burden of proof for the Dutch public prosecutor on the basis of the generic definition weighs heavier that that of their Belgian colleagues on the basis of the specific provision.

Intent as key argument
As stated, the difference between art. 302 and 303 DPC lies in the requirement set for intent. For art. 302 DPC proof that the accused has acted deliberately is sufficient, in the sense of a minimal awareness of the acceptance of a considerable likelihood. As we know this requirement for intent does not correspond to the intention of the offender; the criminal intent is neutral. The situation is otherwise in art. 303 DPC: the committing of ‘gross maltreatment with premeditation’ cannot be other than intentional; one acts in full awareness of the ‘wrongfulness’ of his/her act. The full awareness of the unlawful character of the action that is expressed in the premeditation, in conjunction with the ‘wrongfulness’ of the act, must be proven by the public prosecutor. For art. 409 BPC the same demand pertains, though to a lesser degree: the Belgian public prosecutor must prove that there is evidence of ´mutilation’, which implies a deliberate unlawful act. The difference in burden of proof pertaining to art. 302 DPC therefore does not lie in the intent alone, but in the direct relation between the intent and the unlawfulness that is expressed in the component ´mutilation`. For that reason on the basis of art. 409 BPC a heavier burden of proof pertains for the Belgian public prosecutor as far as intent is concerned than for his/her Dutch colleague on the basis of art. 302 DPC. However, this advantage on the Dutch side should be somewhat qualified: in light of that which in the sense of art. 409 BPC must be understood as ‘mutilation of the person of the female gender’, there would seem to be little argument as to the required intent on the basis of the facts. The nature of the procedure performed is such that any misinterpretation of the intent would be difficult to imagine.

6. Conclusion
It is time for a conclusion. What can the above teach us? Concerning the legal comparison made in para. 5 the conclusion must be drawn that no definitive answer can be given to the question of whether a specific provision offers sufficient practical advantages to warrant its adoption on those grounds. Prosecution relevant to FGM could be principally based on art. 303 DPC and alternatively as a violation of art. 302 DPC, both in connection with art. 304 sub 1 DPC if appropriate. The weight of the burden of proof for the first definition and the possible failure in this matter can be overcome by an alternative indictment. Compared to the Belgian definition, when the advantages and disadvantages in such a case are weighed against each other, a specific provision offers no clear judicial advantages. However, this does not exclude the possibility of adding a new paragraph to art. 300-303 DPC, justifying increased maximum sentences in case of FGM. 
Moreover, when the normative, symbolic function of criminal justice is considered, the adoption of a specific provision is desirable. It has been argued that FGM seriously violates the equality between the sexes, substantiated in severe damage to physical and psychological integrity. From a Western perspective the protection of this integrity should prevail over claims on cultural self-determination, certainly where there is evidence of gendered cultural traditions.














^1	  Lecturer/researcher at the Willem Pompe Institute, Utrecht University.
^2	  The term female genital mutilation is employed by WHO and the UN Committee for Children’s Rights , among others. The purpose of the term is to express that in addition to the physical aspect of circumcision, the social-economic context must also be examined. 
^3	  European Parliament, Verslag over verminking van de geslachtsorganen bij vrouwen [Report on mutilation of the sexual organs of women], (Strasbourg, 2001) A5-0285/2001, 8/33.
^4	  M. Masclee & S. Meuwese, ‘Genitale verminking bij vrouwen en meisjes’, [‘Genital mutilation in women and girls’] 49 Ars Aequi (2000), 7/8, 538. Also the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 forbids such practices; Note, ‘What’s culture got to do with it? Excising the harmful tradition of female circumcision, 106 Harvard Law Review (1993), 1954-1956.
^5	  The legal portion of this investigation has been carried out by the Willem Pompe Institute, Utrecht University; R.S.B. Kool, A. Beijer, C.F. van Drumpt, J. Eelman en G.J. Knoops, Genitale vrouwelijke verminking in juridisch perspectief [A  judicial perspective on Genital Female Mutilation], Utrecht, januari 2005.
^6	  Godelieve van Geertruyen, Vrouwelijke genitale verminking: de sociaal-culturele context [Female genital mutilation: the social-cultural context], Afrika Vereniging van de Universiteit van Gent, Text 1; http://cas1.elis.rug.ac.be/avrug/vrouwell.htm.
^7	  J.A. Liu, ‘When law and culture clash: female genital mutilation, a traditional practice gaining recognition as a global concern’, New York International Law Review (Fall 1998) 1; T. Veerman, A. Hendriks & J. Smith, ‘Recht doen aan de gezondheid(sbelangen) van kinderen’[‘Asserting children’s health rights’], 21 Recht en kritiek (1995) 140.
^8	  The desire of mothers to spare their daughters from a painful memory is given as an explanation for this type of extremely early circumcision. Such early circumcision is common amongst Malinese immigrants living in France, amongst others. Infant examinations have created an opportunity for monitoring and prevention. 
^9	  M. van der Liet-Senders, ‘Inbreuken op seksuele en reproductieve rechten’, [‘Infringement on sexual and reproductive rights’] in I. Boerefijn, M.M. van der Liet-Senders and T. Loenen (editors), Het voorkomen en bestrijden van geweld tegen vrouwen [The prevention and combating of violence against women], (The Hague: SZW, 2000) 238-239.
^10	  Van der Liet-Senders, supra n. 9, 239.
^11	  The only systematic exception that can be thought of here is the circumcision of boys, which is practised on a large scale in the Western world (and elsewhere). While this form of circumcision in its outer form is comparable to the lightest form of FGM, the underlying reasons for it significantly differ. Recently the circumcision of boys has also been called into question by the Dutch member of parliament A. Hirschi Ali.
^12	  L-J. Leusink, Een huis is niet mooi zonder toegangsdeuren. Over vrouwenbesnijdenis , doctoraalscriptie, Rechtsgeleerdheid, Universiteit Utrecht, december 2003.
^13	  K. Boulmare-Miller, ‘Vrouwenbesnijdenis’[‘Female circumcision’], Nemesis (1988), 139.
^14	  A. Funder, ‘De minimis non curat lex: the clitoris, culture and the law´, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (Fall,1993) 10; Note, supra n. 4, 1952.
^15	  Van Geertruyen, supra n. 6; Boulware-Miller, supra n. 12, 141; Funder, supra n. 13, 9.
^16	  See for these, summary, among others, M-C. Foblets, ‘De Parijse besnijdenisprocessen’, [‘The Parisian circumcision suits’] Recht der Werkelijkheid (1992) 107-117 resp. ‘Vrouwenbesnijdenis. Over handhavingsmodellen van mensenrechten’ [‘Female circumcision. On enforcement models of human rights’], 2 Recht der Werkelijkheid (1993) 201-206.
^17	  L.Bibbings, ‘Human Rights and the criminalisation of tradition: the practices formerly known as “female circumcision”’, in P. Alldridge & C. Brants, Private Atunomy, and the Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 139-161; Funder, supra n. 13, 12
^18	  Note, supra n. 4, 1958.
^19	  J. E. Goldschmidt, ‘Het grotere gelijk: alternatieven voor een destructieve verabsolutering van het gelijkheidsbeginsel’ [‘The greater good: alternatives to the destructive process of making the equality principle absolute’], 29 (2004) NJCM, 786; Funder, supra n. 13, 17; Bibbings, supra n. 16.
^20	  K. Meerschaut & A. Backs, Vrouwenbesnijdenis en recht [Female circumcision and law], Afrika Vereniging [Africa Society] of the University of Gent, Text 4, http://cas1.elis.rug.ac.be/avrug/vrouwel4.htm; A.C. ’t Hart, Hier gelden wetten! [There are laws here!] (Deventer: Gouda Quint, 2001) 212. See also: H. Willekens, ‘Culturele conflicten en vrouwenonderdrukking’ [‘Cultural conflicts and the oppression of women’], 13 Recht der Werkelijkheid (1992) 169-174 and H. Ietswaart, ‘Waar moet dat heen? Over wetenschap en politiek’ [‘Where is it going? On science and politics’] 14 Recht der Werkelijkheid (1993) 195-201, both in reaction to Foblets, supra n. 15; E. van Middelkoop, De rechtbank als Spiegel van de multi-culturele samenleving [The court: reflecting the multicultural society], 7 Trema (2004) 295-298.
^21	  J. Tigchelaar, ‘De politieke partij, de trouwambtenaar en de imam’ [‘The political party, the marriage registrar and the imam’], Nemesis (2002) 72-63; Tigchelaar indicates the social vulnerability of the minority group as a factor in the decision-making in jurisprudence on equity.
^22	  R. Holtmaat, ‘De meerwaarde van het VN-verdrag in de multiculturele samenleving’, [‘The additional benefit of the UN convention in the multicultural society’] in R. Holtmaat (ed.), Een verdrag voor alle vrouwen [A convention for all women] (The Hague: E-quality, 2002) 130-133. 
^23	  Goldschmidt, supra n. 18, 790 emphasises the importance of a material approach to the equality foundation and indicates its accessory character.
^24	  S. Saharso, ‘Over de grens: zwarte, migranten en vluchtelingenvrouwen in het debat over multiculturaliteit’, [‘Over the border: black, migrant and refugee women in the debate on multiculturality’] in R. Holtmaat, supra n. 21, 41-57; R. Römkens, ‘Geweld tegen vrouwen en het debat over multiculturaliteit’ [Violence against women and the debate on multiculturality’], in R. Holtmaat, supra n. 21, 57-71.
^25	  Römkens, supra n. 23, 47; she discusses “ambiguïteit in politieke overwegingen” [“ambiguity in political considerations”].
^26	  Goldschmidt, supra n. 18, 788-790; Goldschmidt identifies the gravity of the violation as one of the factors which can form a limit for adjudication of a right to cultural self-determination as a consequence of equality. 
^27	  Incidentally, my intention here is not a territorial restriction of jurisdiction, but only a limitation of political intervention into circumcision elsewhere, particularly in non-Western countries. Not only would such a limitation of national jurisdiction not be in accordance with the foundation of judicial authority (art. 2-5 DPC), at the same time it would impede effectively combating FGM in the country of origin. In any case the circumcisions of many girls who reside in the Netherlands are commonly performed in other countries. A liberalisation of the national judicial authority via decline of the demand for double punishability, as pending in parliament, would seem likely sooner (TK 2003-2004, 29451, nr. 2). Moreover, further liberalisation of judicial authority, analogous to art. 5a DPC could be considered.
^28	  Funder, supra n. 13, 10. See also 11: ‘The link between cultural autonomy and the autonomy of men to control women is rarely drawn, but is has detrimental effects. Not the least of these is the reluctance of Western human right writers, for fear of claims of cultural imperialism, to criticise a cultural practice (for example, female genital mutilation). This is strategic misnaming: a cultural practice is in fact a culturally specific variant of the universal exercise of autocratic (that is patriarchal) power which holds sway in spheres of life where civil and political rights, and equivalent standards of justice to those in civil society, do not apply’. See also for the Dutch discussion: H.Wiersinga, ‘Het beschavingsoffensief van de wetgever’ [‘The civilisation offensive of the legislator’], 2 Recht en kritiek (1997) 128-154 and from the same author: Nuance in benadering [Nuance in approach] (Deventer: Kluwer, 2002), dissertation RUL. 
^29	  Veerman, Hendriks & Smith, supra n. 7, 151.
^30	  Veerman, Hendriks & Smith, supra n. 7, 150, where they refer to the Nielsen case, EHRM 28 November 1990, NJ 1991, 541, m.nt. EAA.
^31	  HR 1 July 1982, NJ 1983, 201, m.nt. EEA. 
^32	  Veerman, Hendriks & Smith, supra n. 3, 153-154.
^33	  Veerman, Hendriks & Smith, supran. 3, 162; Liu, supra n. 8, 7. See also in this respect Funder, supra n. 13, 5, which points out that for minorities the right to cultural self-determination is coloured by an imperialistic past, which may provide occasion for a certain relaxing of the prohibition on FGM. See also: K. Bartels & I. Haaijer,  ’s Lands wijs, ’s lands eer? Vrouwenbesnijdenis en Somalische vrouuen in Nederland [‘A country’s way, a country’s honour? Somali women in the Netherlands] (The Hague: Pharos, 1992) 113 and G. Nienhuis, Knagen aan een oude traditie [Gnawing away at an old tradition], (The Hague: Pharos, 2004); the author refers to the recent evaluation of the prevention project ‘Van beleid naar praktijk’ [‘From policy to practice’], from which it appears that many parents would like their daughters to undergo a lesser form of circumcision. 
^34	  While most professional groups, including the KNMG, take the position that reporting is not compatible with the confidentiality of the therapist or care professional relationship, there are exceptions. See regarding these: Geneeskundige Hoofdinspectie van de Volksgezondheid, ´Informatie over vrouwenbesnijdenis´  [‘Information on female circumcision’] (Rijswijk: GHIbulletin, 1994), where reporting is required.
^35	  Here there is a significant difference to the French practice, where pursuant to art. 434-3 Code Penal it is a duty to report violations, also for the medical sector. At the same time an exception to professional secrecy is made (art. 226-13 Code Penal). For comparison: art. 458bis Belgian Penal Code specifies the right to report violations, in which the report should be made directly to the public prosecutor. 
^36	  European Parliament, ‘Resolutie van het Europese Parlement over genitale verminking van vrouwen´  [‘Resolution of the European Parliament on the genital mutilation of women’] (2001/2035(INI) (Strasbourg, 20 September 2001), consideration 11.
^37	  See regarding this: TK 2003-2004, 22894, 23, motion Arib. Furthermore: TK 2003-2004, 29200 XVI, 231, 10; A. Hirsi Ali, Voorstel tot het invoeren van een controlesysteem ter bestrijding van genitale verminking [Proposal for the adoption of a monitoring system to combat genital mutilation] (The Hague: VVD political party, 2004) and B. Dittrich, ‘De strafbaarstelling van vrouwenbesnijdenis’, [‘Penalisation for female circumcision’] 4 Proces (2003)202-204.
^38	  TK 2003-2004, 29200 XVI, 231, 8. The government comes to this conclusion on the basis of the investigative report by Van der Kwaak, c.s.; A. van der Kwaak, E. Bartels, F. de Vries and S. Meuwese, ‘Strategieën ter voorkoming van meisjesbesnijdenis, inventarisatie en aanbevelingen’ [Strategies for the prevention of girls’ circumcision, inventorisation and recommendations] (The Hague: Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 2003). 
^39	  E. Bartels, A. van der Kwaak and H. Bartels, ‘Meisjesbesnijdenis in justitieel perspectief’ [‘Girls’ circumcision from a judicial perspective’], Proces (2002) 52.  
^40	  See for the finding that a specific provision leads to problems of evidence: WHO, Department of Women’s Health, Health System and Community Health, Female, ‘Genital Mutilation. Programmes to date: What works and what doesn’t. A review’ (Genève, 1999).
^41	  ’t Hart, supra n. 18, 205.
^42	  ’t Hart, supra n. 18, 217-218.
^43	  ‘t Hart, supra n. 18, 247.
^44	  Meerschaut & Backs, supra n. 19; ´t Hart, supra n. 18, 242.
^45	  TK 2003-2004, 29200, XVI, 231, 7; the term comes from Minister Hoogervorst.
^46	  Kool, Tekst en Commentaar Strafrecht, Titel XIV, ‘Inleidende opmerkingen’, aantekening 1[Text and Commentary on Criminal Law, Title XIV, ‘Introductory remarks’, note 1].
^47	  Bartels, Van der Kwaak and Bartels, supra n. 39, 52.
^48	  See among others Dittrich, supra n. 37, in which he proposes the use of paid Somali confidential advisors.
^49	  C. Kelk and R.S.B. Kool, ´(Psychische) overmacht´ [‘Psychiatric circumstances beyond one’s control’], Delikt en Delinkwent, column on Rechtspraak [Jurisprudence] (2004) 8 100-109. 
^50	  Belgian House of Representatives, Wetsontwerp betreffende de strafrechtelijke bescherming van minderjarigen [Bill on the criminal protection of minors], 1907/1-98/99, 4 January 1999, explanatory memorandum, S- 5372, 15, art. 21. It should be noted that this amendment constituted a direct reaction to the Dutroux affair and therefore was sharply focussed on the protection of juveniles.
^51	  Art. 409 para 5 Belgian Penal Code states:‘In para. 1 if the intended mutilation of a minor or a person that by reason of his/her physical or emotional condition is incapable of providing for him/herself, is carried out by his/her father, mother or other blood relation in the ascending line, or by any other person who has authority over the minor or incapable person, or by a person who has him/her under remand, or by a person who occasionally or habitually resides with the victim, the minimum punishment listed in para. 1 to 4 is doubled in the case of imprisonment and extended by two years in the case of confinement.’
^52	  Wemes/Cleiren and Nijboer, Tekst en Commentaar Strafrecht [Text and Commentary on Criminal Law], article 82, notes 1 and 2.
^53	  Belgian House of Representatives, supra n. 51, 16; Noyon/Langemeijer/Remmelink, Het Wetboek van Strafrecht [Criminal Law Statute Book], article 300 DPC, note 1a.
^54	  J. de Hullu, Materieel strafrecht [Material law] (Deventer: Gouda Quint, 2003) 183. 
^55	  Art. 409 para 3 BPC states:´If the mutilation has caused an apparently incurable illness or chronic incapacity to work, the punishment is five to ten years´
^56	  Cleiren and Nijboer, ‘Tekst en Commentaar Strafrecht’ [Text and Commentary on Criminal Law], article 303, note 1. 
^57	  It is evident that there are problems having to do with collecting evidence, but that can remain outside consideration in the scope of this legal comparison directed toward penalisation.
^58	  Cleiren and Nijboer,Tekst en Commentaar Strafrecht, artikel 303, aantekening  1 [Text and Commentary on Criminal Law], article 303, note 1.
^59	  Actually, no choice is necessary. The public prosecutor can choose a principle/alternative indictment, based on art. 303 or 302 DPC. 
